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1.  INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
 
During the last few years the increasing recognition that there are considerable flows into 
and out of the poverty pool (e.g. see Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000) has focused interest in 
household vulnerability as the basis for a social protection strategy. As advocated by 
Holzmann and Jorgensen (2000), in a dynamic environment where adverse economic shocks 
may be more easily transmitted across geographic borders, a social protection scheme might 
be able to perform more effectively the task of protecting households from the adverse 
effects of poverty by adopting a forward looking approach that not only identifies the groups 
of households that are presently poor but also the households that are vulnerable to economic 
shocks and other risks such as natural disasters and climate conditions.   Whether households 
can effectively insure their consumption against shocks may be an important element 
determining their vulnerability to poverty, particularly if shocks have longer term effects. 
  This paper brings together some of the empirical work conducted by IFPRI 
researchers which investigates linkages among the degree of consumption insurance, 
households’ vulnerability to poverty, and household use of formal and informal coping 
mechanisms using the same empirical  approach in five different countries. Building on the 
recent literature of consumption smoothing and risk sharing, the degree of consumption 
insurance is defined by the degree to which the growth rate of household consumption 
covaries with the growth rate of household income.  This definition of consumption 
insurance explicitly acknowledges that households may adopt a variety of risk management 
strategies and instruments in order to protect themselves from risk. Households in a 
community, for example, may informally agree to insure each other or provide state 
contingent transfers and remittances to friends and neighbors (Rosenzweig, 1988; Besley, 
1995; Morduch, 1999).  Households may undertake ex-ante income-smoothing strategies and 
adopt low return-low risk crop and asset portfolios (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993).   
Households may use their savings (Paxson, 1992), take loans from the formal financial sector 
to carry them through the difficult times (Udry, 1994), sell assets (Deaton, 1993), or send 
their children to work instead of school in order to supplement income (Jacoby and Skoufias,   2
1997).  These actions enable households to spread the effects of income shocks through time. 
Additional strategies include the management of income risk through ex-post adjustments in 
labor supply such as multiple job holding, and engaging in other informal economic activities 
(Morduch, 1995; Kochar, 1988). 
1 
Independently of the combination of strategies accessible to households, the risk 
sharing literature suggests that attempts to insure consumption from shocks have 
implications on the extent to which the growth rate of consumption is correlated with the size 
of the shock. In fact, in its extreme version the perfect risk sharing hypothesis implies that, 
once aggregate shocks are taken into consideration, the growth rate of consumption would be 
independent of any idiosyncratic shock affecting the resources of or the income available to 
the household (e.g. Mace, 1991; Cochrane, 1991; Deaton, 1992; Townsend, 1994). The 
measure of consumption insurance adopted here builds on these insights provided by the 
consumption smoothing and risk sharing literature. An implicit assumption in this measure of 
insurance, is that the greater the correlation is between the growth rate of household 
consumption and income the less effective is the risk management strategy adopted by the 
household.
  
The presentation begins with a discussion of the theoretical framework motivating the 
proposed measure of insurance, and its relation to other measures that have been empirically 
implemented in the recent literature. Section 3 summarizes the main findings from the five 
studies representing five very different socio-economic environments: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Zone Lacustre in Mali, Mexico and Russia.  All five studies begin by investigating the extent 
to which households in their respective sample manage to protect their consumption from 
specific shocks such as loss of productive time due to illness (Mali, Bangladesh and 
Ethiopia), loss of livestock (due to theft or death) and wage and employment shocks 
(Russia). In addition all five studies examine how household consumption correlates with 
income changes. At this aggregate level three main questions are addressed. The first 
                                                      
1 According to the terminology of Seigel and Alwang, (1999) the preceding actions represent a 
combination of ex-ante risk mitigating and ex-post coping actions both aimed at smoothing 
consumption. Households may adopt ex-ante risk-reducing management strategies such as   3
concerns the extent to which households are able to smooth their food consumption and 
nonfood consumption across time. The second examines the relationship between 
consumption insurance and vulnerability to poverty.  This analysis is conducted at a more 
disaggregate level by examining whether specific groups of households defined by 
observable characteristics of the household or its head (such as age, occupation, etc) are more 
or less vulnerable to economic shocks.  In the Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Russia case studies, 
repeated observations per household are used to construct a household-specific consumption 
insurance measure.
2 This allows one to examine in more detail the partial correlation of  
household consumption insurance with household characteristics as well as the extent to 
which households’ ability to insure their consumption is correlated with the current status of 
poverty of the household as well as the probability of a household becoming poor over time. 
Finally, the third relates to the different strategies households adopt in order to 
smooth their consumption. In particular, is consumption smoothing achieved primarily 
through cross-sectional risk pooling institutions, credit markets that spread the effects of 
income shocks through time, or by adjustments in labor supply and occupation? 
Understanding the specific strategies that households adopt to buffer income fluctuations is 
critical to the design of an effective social safety net system in any country. Chronic and 
transient poverty could be simultaneously reduced by providing the appropriate risk 
management instruments to the households that do not have access to them.  
 
2.  AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR VULNERABILITY TO RISK AND 
SOME DISCUSSION 
 
The theoretical model guiding the empirical analysis is based on the consumer’s 
optimization problem in the context of a complete market for state contingent commodities 
                                                                                                                                                                      
diversifying the mix of income generating activities from their given asset base (Morduch, 1994, 
1995). 
2 The Russia case study has five repeated observations per household while the Bangladesh and 
Ethiopia studies have four.   4
(e.g., see Deaton, 1992). The assumption of a complete market for state contingent 
commodities may be considered as a simple approximation to all the formal and informal 
arrangements across space and over time that households can enter into in order to protect 
themselves from risk. With this in mind, households within a given insurance community, 
such as a family, or a village or a city or even a nation, are assumed to purchase state 
contingent commodities so as to maximize 



















h c c V
11 11
1 υ δ π υ π       ( 1 )  
 
where  ( )
h
ts t c υ  is the period-specific “felicity” function of household h in period t as a 
function of its consumption in state s and in period t, assumed to be discounted to the present 
by the subjective discount rate δ , and  s π is the probability of state s (assumed to be the same 
for all households). With the ability to buy in period 1 a unit of consumption in state s at time 
t for  () pr st
t 1+
− , and assuming that household h has initial assets 
h A1  and labor income in 
period t and state s, denoted by  yst
h , the lifetime budget constraint of household h can be 
expressed as  
 






















1 1 .     (2) 
 
Thus the existence of the market in contingent claims allows the problem to be written as the 
maximization of expected utility subject to an expected value budget constraint.  The first 
order optimization condition for (1) subject to (2) with the associated Lagrange multiplier for 
household h , denoted by 
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h c  is the marginal utility of consumption in period t. Thus 
the main implication is that the marginal utility of consumption has a two-factor structure, 
consisting of a household-specific component θ
h  and a time-specific component µt .
3 
Given a specific functional form for the felicity function such as an isoelastic utility 
function  () () υ
ρ
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Equation (4) implies that the growth rate in household consumption between time t-1 and t, 
after controlling for the influence of time-varying taste factors, is a function only of the 
growth rate in the aggregate or covariate risk summarized by the term  () t µ ρ ln
1 ∆ −
− .  
The version of equation (4) that is more commonly encountered in the empirical 
literature (e.g. see Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1998) is of the form  
 
() htvt hvt htv tv tv tv htv X y D c ε δ β δ ∆ + + ∆ + = ∆ ∑ ln ln      (5) 
 
                                                      
3 Altug and Miller (1990) provide a more detailed discussion of this two-factor structure of the 
marginal utility of consumption in an equilibrium with a complete set of markets. 
4 Cochrane (1991) , Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994, 1995) provide more detailed exposition of the 
functional forms for preferences.   6
where  htv c ln ∆  denotes the change in log consumption or the growth rate in total 
consumption per capita of household h, in period t (i.e., between round t and round t-1), in 
community v,  htv y ln ∆  is the growth rate of income, X is a vector of household or household 
head’s characteristics, δ, β, and δ are parameters to be estimated,  htvt ε ∆ is a household-
specific error term capturing changes in the unobservable components of household 
preferences, and  vt D  denotes a set of binary variables identifying each community separately 
by survey round. This set of survey round/community interaction terms is meant to control 
for the role of aggregate or covariate risk faced by households in the insurance community. 
In this specification, the parameter β provides an estimate of the extent to which 
idiosyncratic income changes play a significant role in explaining the household-specific 
consumption growth rate. Unlike specific models of intertemporal consumption such as the 
permanent income model of consumption which predicts that with perfect credit markets it is 
only unanticipated income changes that may affect consumption growth (e.g., Deaton, 1992), 
the idiosyncratic income changes in equation (5) can be anticipated as well as unanticipated. 
5  The set of binary terms  vt D  identifying communities by survey round serve two 
interrelated functions. Firstly, they control for the role of aggregate (or covariate) shocks 
common to all households within any given community and survey round, i.e. the term 
() t µ ρ ln
1 ∆ −
−  in equation (4).
6  Secondly, given that consumption and income are in 
logarithms, they also account for potential differences in the round to round inflation rate 
across communities.
7 
                                                      
5 Other terms used to characterize income changes are “permanent” versus “transitory”. These are 
related to the terms anticipated and unanticipated but which set of terms is used depends on whether 
a study adopts a microeconomic model of expectation formation (such as the rational expectations 
hypothesis) or a statistically oriented approach to decomposing a time series in income growth. For a 
paper that attempts to delineate among the predictions of various models of intertemporal 
consumption, see Jacoby and Skoufias (1998). 
6 Note that including the community/round interaction dummies is equivalent to deviating all 
variables from their respective community/round mean. For more detailed discussion of this 
equivalence see Deaton (1997). 
7 When prices and wages are available, one may also want to include these as explanatory variables 
(first-differenced) in regression equation (6) (e.g., see Dercon and Krishnan, 2000).   7
Much of the focus of the empirical literature on risk sharing in developing and 
developed countries alike has focused on testing the prediction derived under complete risk 
sharing which states that β=0 (e.g. see Townsend, 1994; Mace, 1991; and Jacoby and 
Skoufias, 1998).
8 Although frequently complete risk sharing is rejected, it is typically 
observed that the estimated values of β are generally low (or close to zero) which implies 
that the growth rate of consumption is related to the (contemporaneous) growth rate of 
income, but certainly less so than what one would expect under an alternative hypothesis 
(e.g. β=1) as implied by complete autarky and the complete lack of any risk sharing tools. 
These findings provide strong indications that households engage in risk management 
strategies aimed at insulating, at least partially, consumption changes from income changes.  
As in Amin, Rai, and Topa (2001), the measure of consumption insurance adopted here takes 
this idea to the next logical step by interpreting higher estimated values of β as signifying a 
higher covariance between income and consumption changes and thus a higher vulnerability 
of consumption to income risk.
 9  
Undoubtedly, the data requirements associated with the estimation of regression (5) 
are quite severe. Not only is it necessary to have a panel household survey but also the 
survey must collect information on both household consumption and income. Moreover, if 
the coefficient β summarizing the partial covariance between consumption and income 
changes is to be estimated with some precision at the household level instead of just for the 
sample as a whole it is necessary to have at least three or four repeated observations per 
household in the panel.
10 To the extent that repeated observations per household in panel 
survey do not exceed two or three, one may have to settle with estimating the degree of 
consumption insurance for groups of households with a groups defined by some observable 
(and preferably time invariant) characteristic. 
                                                      
8 It should also be kept in mind that if consumption and leisure are nonseparable and labor leisure 
choices are endogenous the rejection of the hypothesis that β=0, does not necessarily imply the 
absence of risk sharing among households (Cochrane, 1991). 
9 The same idea is also explored by Schechter (2001) for Bulgaria, and Ligon (2001) for India. 
10 It suffices to say that the higher the number of time observations per household the lower the 
variance of the estimated coefficient β.    8
At this point it is important to relate this measure of consumption insurance to other 
measures of vulnerability encountered recently in the literature. Firstly, the estimated value 
of the coefficient β provides a measure of the degree of consumption insurance. or the extent 
to which consumption growth is insured from idiosyncratic income shocks. A measure of 
vulnerability commonly encountered in the literature is that of vulnerability to poverty, 
typically measured by the probability that the consumption of a household will fall below a 
predetermined poverty line within a fixed time interval (e.g. see Pritchett et al, 2000; and 
Chaudhuri et al, 2001; Christiaensen and Subbarao, 2001). Vulnerability to poverty attempts 
to predict (ex-ante) the probability that a household may become poor during a fixed time 
interval, whereas the degree of consumption insurance focuses on the extent to which to 
which households are successful (ex-post) at insulating their consumption from changes in 
their income opportunities and other shocks.  It is possible, though perhaps not very likely, 
for an apparently non-poor household to be well insured, and yet be vulnerable to poverty.
11 
Households for example, may avoid taking risky but profitable opportunities or practice 
income smoothing as a substitute for consumption smoothing (Morduch, 1994). In that sense, 
the degree of income risk may in fact be endogenous.  Others may be able to smooth their 
consumption through coping strategies that deplete their assets, such as selling their livestock 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993), withdrawing their children form school when there are 
shortfall in income (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997), or using assets as a buffer for consumption 
(Deaton, 1992). As a consequence of all these risk management and risk-coping strategies, 
households may appear to be more insured, when in fact their vulnerability to future poverty 
may be increasing.  Clearly, the extent to which consumption insurance is informative about 
vulnerability to poverty is a question that can only be addressed empirically. 
12One advantage 
offered by the approach proposed here is that it offers the opportunity to determine whether 
                                                      
11 Along similar lines, it is also possible for a wealthy household to be quite vulnerable to risk and yet 
not vulnerable to poverty. 
12 To a large extent our emphasis on consumption insurance instead of vulnerability to poverty 
originates from the belief that for any meaningful progress in measuring the latter one must be 
willing to adopt a specific model for the intertemporal allocation of consumption and credit 
constraints faced by households.   9
and the extent to which lack of insurance is correlated with the probability of a household 
becoming poor (or vulnerability to poverty). 
Another important aspect of the consumption insurance measure is that is based on 
the covariance of consumption and income changes and not solely on the variance of 
consumption or income changes. Thus it does not necessarily follow that households with a 
higher variance in income (or income growth) or a higher variance of consumption (or 
consumption growth) will be also less insured. In other words, if the variance of income 
growth faced by a household increases, this does not necessarily imply that the household 
will be more vulnerable to risk. In contrast, measures of vulnerability to poverty are to a 
large extent related or even synonymous with increases in the variance of consumption 
within a cross-section of households (as in Chaudhuri et al., 2001) or the variance of 
consumption growth (as in Pritchett, et al. 2000; Kamanou and Morduch, 2001). 
13 
Thirdly, the focus on income risk implicitly assumes that all shocks experienced by a 
household affect the growth rate of household consumption through their impact on the 
contemporaneous growth rate on household income. Put differently, the growth rate of 
household income is assumed to act as a “sufficient statistic” for all the shocks experienced 
by the household. Following the same general approach to defining vulnerability, Dercon and 
Krishnan (2000), for example, use shocks instead of income.  For example, their measure of 
vulnerability to poverty is basically determined by the coefficients of shocks variables (or an 
index constructed of various shock variables) estimated from a regression equation such as  
() hvt hvt i htv i tv tv tv htv X i S D c ε γ β δ ∆ + + + = ∆ ∑ ∑ ) ( l n       ( 6 )  
where S(i) denotes shocks such as crop damage due to pests, illness and other.  One practical 
advantage of using income as opposed to specific shocks as in specification like (6) is that as 
long as there is information available on shocks that might have impacted on the household, 
                                                      
13 Interestingly none of the vulnerability to poverty measures proposed to date seems to take in to 
consideration the few known facts about the variance of consumption over time. Deaton and Paxson 
(1994), for example, demonstrate that within any given cohort the variance of consumption increases 
over time and this variance may differ across cohorts. This implies that at any given point in time any 
attempt to characterize the variance of consumption changes of households must take into 
consideration the age distribution of the population since different households are likely to be at 
different points in their life-cycle.   10
it can be used as an instrument for the change in household income so as to account for the 
role of measurement error in income.
14 In principle, once a consistent and fairly robust 
measure of consumption insurance based on equation (5) is obtained, one may also want to 
also construct a vulnerability to poverty measure based on estimates that the consumption of 
the household may fall below a poverty line as a result of any given change in income. 
Another advantage offered from the proposed insurance measure proposed here is 
that it offers the opportunity to determine exposure to risk arising from idiosyncratic risk and 
covariate risk either separately as well as in combination. While the discussion so far focused 
on the coefficient of idiosyncratic income changes (that is after controlling for covariate risk 
or community round effects) it is important to note that with minor changes in the 
specification of equation (5) one may also analyze consumption variability arising from 
aggregate risk. One option is to simply exclude from the equation to be estimated the set of 
binary variables  vt D  summarizing covariate risk, as in equation (6b) below. 
htvt hvt htv htv X y c ε δ β α ∆ + + ∆ + = ∆ ln
~
ln       ( 6 b )  
In this case the coefficient β
~
provides an estimate of consumption variability inclusive of 
both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. To the extent that risk sharing takes place and 
covariate risk has a significant role in explaining household consumption changes, then it is 
expected that  β β >
~
 with the difference  β β γ − =
~
 summarizing the role of covariate risk in 
the growth rate of consumption.
15 
A related specification but at the same time with weaker theoretical foundations is 
that of equation (7) below (e.g see Deaton 1997; and Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997)  
( ) hvt hvt vt hvt htv X y y c ε δ γ β α ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ ln ln ln      (7) 
This specification allows the growth rate in household consumption to be determined by the 
growth rate in household income as well as the growth rate in average community income 
denoted by  ( ) vt y ln ∆ . In a purely autarkic world, where there is no pooling of resources and 
                                                      
14 In fact this approach is taken in all of the IFPRI papers surveyed here. Details are discussed in the 
next section of the paper. 
15 This point is also noted by Deaton (1990).   11
risk sharing, the growth rate in the average community income should have no impact on the 
growth rate of consumption of any one household. Evidence that the growth rate in average 
community income has a significant role in the growth rate of household consumption (i.e., 
γ≠0) is consistent with the hypothesis that some risk sharing is taking place within 
communities.
16 
One drawback of this approach, however, is its symmetric treatment of positive and 
negative shocks.  The consumption insurance approach implicitly suggests that the 
distinction between positive and negative shocks is irrelevant.  However, the factors that 
determine whether one can deal with positive shocks (including access to safe assets and 
savings instruments) compared to dealing with negative shocks  (selling assets, receiving 
transfers, or obtaining credit) may be quite different in general and between households.
17  
While credit may be hard to obtain, savings (via livestock or grain stores) is likely to be 
easier.  Thus, interpreting β  from (5) as a measure of vulnerability—rather than a measure of 
consumption insurance—could lead to wrong inferences about the vulnerability of 
households.
18 
  Having described the economic framework underlying the measure of consumption 
insurance proposed here, the next section summarizes and elaborates on the findings reported 
by the five case studies.  
 
3.  CONSUMPTION INSURANCE AND POVERTY: SUMMARY AND 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
                                                      
16 Deaton (1997) first noted that the coefficient of idiosyncratic income changes in specification (7) 
will be (mechanically) identical to the coefficient of idiosyncratic income changes in specification (5), 
where the community/survey round interaction dummies are used instead of the change in village 
mean income. 
17 This draws heavily from Dercon 2002. 
18 Empirically, one can distinguish between positive and negative shocks, although in the present 
paper we impose the same coefficient on income changes.   12
The five case studies discussed here cover very geographically diverse areas. The data used 
in the Bangladesh study come from a four-round panel survey of 957 households conducted 
at four-month intervals between June 1996 and September 1997 in 47 villages in three sites 
in Bangladesh, each site chosen as part of an impact evaluation of program disseminating 
new agricultural technologies. The Ethiopia case study uses four rounds of the Ethiopian 
Rural Household Survey (ERHS). The first three rounds of this survey were conducted in 
1994/95 while the fourth round was conducted in 1997. The ERHS covers approximately 
1,5000 households randomly selected within 15 villages all across Ethiopia. The villages 
themselves were chosen to represent the major farming systems used in Ethiopia.  
The Mali case study uses panel data from 275 households from 10 villages surveyed 
between 1997 and 1998 for 4 rounds from Zone Lacustre area situated in the northern region 
of the Niger River Valley. The Mexican case study uses survey data from the sample of rural 
households surveyed three times between October 1998 and November 1999 for the purpose 
of evaluating PROGRESA, a national cash transfer program conditioned on households 
investing in their human capital. This survey covers close to 24,000 rural households from 
506 villages assigned into treatment and control groups for the purposes of the evaluation. 
Finally, the data set used in the Russia case study is from phase two of the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for the years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 2000 
(rounds V-IX). The RLMS is a household-based representative survey of Russia collected by 
the Population Center at the University of North Carolina.
19 It is an unbalanced panel 
containing repeated observations for more than 2,800 households.  
 
Consumption and vulnerability to specific shocks 
All five country studies begin their investigation by examining whether the incidence 
of specific shocks has a significant negative impact on the growth rate of household 
consumption from round to round. For this purpose, in each country study equation (6) is 
estimated by appropriately defining what constitutes an insurance group. The four studies 
                                                      
19 The project description at www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms provides complete information about the RLMS 
survey and its sampling procedure.   13
using household level data from surveys in rural areas (i.e. Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, and 
Mexico) identify an insurance community by the village in which the household resides. In 
contrast, the Russia study, that contains households in both urban and rural areas, the 
insurance group is defined to consist of the set of households within a primary sampling unit 
(PSU).
20  
The details associated with the construction of per capita consumption and per capita 
income can be found in the individual country studies. Instead, here we will focus our 
discussion on the findings obtained by distinguishing between food and non-food 
consumption in the five country studies. The separate investigation of these two different 
groups of consumption, in addition to total consumption, yielded a rather rich picture about 
the interplay between risk sharing and insurance from shocks. 
  Table 1 below presents the estimated coefficients of the idiosyncratic shocks on the 
growth rate of monthly per capita food consumption, while table 2 contains the respective 
coefficients for the growth rate of non-food consumption. In each country study, the 
coefficients of the various shock variables were estimated by running a regression with all 
the shock variables included at once in the regression. In all cases the standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients were corrected for unknown forms of heteroskedasticity in the error 
term of the regressions using the formula of White (1980).  
The estimated impact of the various shocks on food consumption does not yield a 
very clear picture.  One would expect that shocks of the type examined here, if they are 
significant, would have a negative effect on food consumption. Surprisingly only in the urban 
areas of Russia the incidence of wage arrears and unemployment seem to affect food 
consumption negatively.  In Ethiopia, better livestock disease outcomes increase food 
consumption.
21  In most other cases, shocks do not have a significant effect on food 
consumption.  For example, in both Bangladesh and Mali, the loss of livestock appears to 
                                                      
20 In principle, insurance arrangements are easier to organize and implement in small or closely-knit 
communities than in larger groups, where the moral hazard, incentive and information difficulties 
are more severe. 
21 Note that the shock variables in the Ethiopia study are as defined by Dercon and Krishnan (2000), 
where a value of one indicates the best outcome.  Thus, these shocks should be interpreted as positive 
shocks, and positive coefficients imply that consumption increased as a result of positive shocks.   14
have no significant role on the growth rate of food consumption per capita. In Mali  and 
Ethiopia, illness does not affect food consumption.  This would suggest that households are 
able to insulate their food consumption from this type of shock. In fact in rural Mexico it 
appears that household food consumption is completely insured from any of the five 
idiosyncratic shocks examined in that case study.    
Table 1 
Examination of the impact of the same shocks on the growth rate of non-food 
expenditures raises some intriguing possibilities. For example, wage arrears and 
unemployment continue to have a significantly negative impact in urban Russia. Moreover, 
the (negative) coefficients of these shocks on non-food consumption are slightly larger than 
for food consumption. This suggests that non-food expenditures may absorb more of the 
shock as a way of insulating food consumption from these same shocks. This interpretation is 
reinforced further by the estimates of the impact of livestock death in Mali and the impact of 
land loss in Mexico. In both cases these shocks have a negative effect on nonfood 




Some caution is warranted in the interpretation of results.  One plausible explanation 
for the overall pattern of these findings may be due to the lack of any substantial variation of 
these shocks within smaller insurance communities. As discussed earlier, the estimates in 
tables 1 and 2 are obtained by estimating equation (6) including as regressors community and 
round interaction effects meant to control for the presence of covariate or aggregate effects in 
the community. To the extent that these shocks are fairly common among households in the 
same insurance community, then the coefficient signs of the idiosyncratic shocks variables 
may be the consequence of strong collinearity with the covariate shocks included in the 
regression. This possibility is investigated in more detail in the Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and 
                                                      
22 The relatively higher coefficients of these shocks for nonfood than for food consumption might also 
be explained in terms of underlying household preferences. Ceteris paribus, in so far as the incidence 
of these shocks represents a decrease in household income then the quantity demanded for luxury   15
Mexico studies, where the coefficients of the shock variables including community round 
shocks can be contrasted with those obtained when community round shocks are left out of 
the regression.
23 In the  Bangladesh case, there is no perceptible difference between the 
estimates with or without covariate shocks.  For Ethiopia, however, the strong aggregate 
component of self-reported idiosyncratic shocks is readily apparent.  Positive rainfall shocks, 
which are not significant in the regression which controls for aggregate shocks, are 
surprisingly negative and significant in regressions for total consumption and food 
consumption per capita.  The livestock shock is no longer significant, while better crop 
outcomes have a significant positive effect on total consumption and nonfood consumption.  
In the case of Mexico, (estimates reported in table 1 here) the coefficients of the shock 
variables are positive but not significant when covariate shocks are controlled for. The same 
coefficients turn negative when the village round dummies are excluded from the regressions 
suggesting that these concerns about vulnerability to idiosyncratic shocks may have some 
solid foundations. 
A more serious caveat arises from the estimation of the effects of shocks on food and 
nonfood consumption separately.  First, a formulation that allows the changes in 
consumption of a commodity (group) only to be a function of community level variables in 
the presence of complete insurance (when β = 0) requires that the marginal utility of food is 
independent of the levels of nonfood consumption, or that preferences are strongly separable 
(additive)—a strong restriction on the structure of preferences for food and nonfood.
24   In 
the extreme case of autarky, where the community dummies control for price changes, then 
the coefficients on food and nonfood  βf  and βnf  would be income elasticities.  The 
insignificant coefficients of income changes in the food consumption regression may 
therefore be more reflective of the low income elasticity of food rather than the differential 
ability to protect food and nonfood consumption.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
goods (nonfood) will decrease more than for necessities (such as food that has an income elasticity 
less than 1). 
23For Mexico, see table 2 panels a and c in Skoufias 2002b.  Results for Bangladesh and Ethiopia are 
available from the authors.   16
Consumption and Household Income 
An alternative test for the hypothesis of complete risk sharing is whether the growth 
rate of household food consumption is independent of the growth rate in household income 
(after controlling for aggregate or covariate shocks). As mentioned in the previous section 
this specification presumes that all of the shocks experienced by the household between 
rounds impact on household consumption solely through the growth of household income. 
As before, under the null hypothesis of complete insurance idiosyncratic changes in 
household income should have no role in explaining household specific consumption growth 
rates, i.e.  β=0.  
The estimates of equation (5) for total as well as for food and non-food consumption 
per capita are presented in Table 3. Although not reported here, it is important to note that in 
all five countries, covariate shocks, as proxied by the community survey round terms were 
significant determinants of consumption changes in the estimation of equations (5). The 
estimates obtained using total (food plus nonfood) consumption suggest that on average total 
consumption is not insured from idiosyncratic income changes in Ethiopia, Mali, Mexico and 
Russia. The estimates obtained by separating food and nonfood reveal a richer picture. In 
most instances food consumption appears to be better insured (or have a lower covariance 
with income) from idiosyncratic changes in income in comparison to nonfood consumption. 
Whereas nonfood consumption is found to be significantly correlated with idiosyncratic 
income shocks in all five countries, food consumption seems to be completely insulated for 
idiosyncratic income shocks in Mali and Ethiopia. Even in Russia where income changes 
significantly affect both food and nonfood consumption, the effect seems to be lower for 
food than for nonfood. These estimates confirm what was already hinted earlier regarding the 
impact of specific shocks on food and nonfood consumption. Food consumption appears to 
be is more likely to be covered by informal insurance arrangements than nonfood.
25  
Table 3 
                                                                                                                                                                      
24 We thank Stefan Dercon for pointing this out. 
25 As already pointed out in footnote 18, the relative differences in the size of the estimated income 
coefficients for food and nonfood may also be attributed to preferences. Food is typically a necessity   17
  Additional information on the extent to which food and non-food consumption are 
differentially covered by risk sharing arrangements can be obtained from table 4, where the 
estimated coefficients of the growth rate in average community income (i.e. of the 
parameters γ from equation 7) are reported. The estimates provide strong evidence 
supporting the role of partial insurance and community risk sharing in food consumption. 
Thus changes in the growth rate of average community income seem to have a positive and 
significant role in the growth rate of food consumption of individual households in all 
countries except Ethiopia. In contrast, no evidence of risk sharing is found with respect to 
non-food expenditures in Mali, Mexico, and Russia. Thus there are considerable indications 
that the available options for insuring nonfood consumption are limited in comparison to 
those for food consumption.  
  One potential shortcoming of the OLS estimates discussed so far is that they may be 
biased due to measurement error in the income variable and imputation errors in the 
calculation of the food consumption of households. By itself, measurement error in the 
income variable gives rise to “attenuation bias” that biases coefficients towards zero. In the 
cases where the income coefficients are significantly different from zero one can be 
reasonably confident that the hypothesis of complete insurance is justifiably rejected and that 
the significant income coefficients in table 3 provide a lower bound estimate of the true 
elasticity of consumption to idiosyncratic income.  
However, it is possible that imputation errors in the construction of the food 
consumption variable may bias the income coefficients upwards (Deaton, 1997). This is 
especially the case for households in rural areas of Mali and Bangladesh. For many of these 
households a significant share of income and consumption is accounted by food that is 
produced and consumed by the household and neither sold nor bought in the market. A 
common practice is to impute a value for food produced and consumed at home using local 
prices for the specific food item produced. Errors in this imputation procedure may be 
positively correlated with measurement errors in the income variable, and for positive 
                                                                                                                                                                      
with a lower (<1) income elasticity while nonfood is a luxury good with a higher (>1) income 
elasticity.    18
coefficients, this upward bias may work in the opposite direction to the standard downward 
attenuation bias produced by the measurement errors in the income variable alone (Deaton, 
1997). Given that the net effect cannot be signed in advance it is prudent to make an effort to 
control for these sources of bias in the estimates.  
Table 5 presents the income coefficient estimates using instrumental variables for the 
changes in household income.  In each of the country studies, the set of instruments used 
included the various shocks variables discussed earlier in the analysis.
26 The instrumental 
variable (IV) estimates presented in table 5 reveal some substantial differences from the 
results obtained from the OLS estimates. The coefficients of income changes on food 
consumption are generally higher suggesting that the concerns about measurement and 
imputation errors may have some foundation. Compared to the OLS coefficients, the 
coefficient of the instrumented income growth variable is higher in all of the regression 
equations irrespective of whether one uses total, food or nonfood consumption. However, the 
lower coefficients of income in the regression equations for food relative to the equations for 
nonfood consumption, continue to support the earlier interpretation that adjustment in non-
food consumption expenditures appears to act as a means of partially insuring ex-post the 
consumption of food from the effects of income changes. 
  In sum the instrumental variable estimates presented above suggest that the proposed 
estimate of household consumption insurance is likely to be subject to opposing and possibly 
reinforcing biases arising from measurement error in income, imputation errors in the 
construction of food consumption and possible endogeneity bias in income. Clearly the 
extent to which estimates of the consumption insurance measure proposed will be consistent 
will depend critically on the availability of adequate instrumental variables for the changes in 
household income.  
 
                                                      
26 In all five country studies, the shock variables  used as identifying instruments in the first stage 
regressions, were significant and negatively correlated with the growth rate of income.  Other 
instruments included changes in income from sources which were not likely to be correlated with 
crop production. Tests on the excluded instruments rejected the null hypothesis that they were equal 
to zero.   19
Differences in Household Consumption Insurance by Observable Characteristics 
  The analysis so far has investigated whether risk sharing is prevalent among 
households in the sample of each country. For example, in the results reported in table 5, the 
reported coefficients of the idiosyncratic change in income represent conditional averages of 
the covariance between consumption and income changes among all the households and by 
default they may mask substantial differences in the extent to which the covariance of 
income and consumption changes differs among households with certain characteristics or 
from household to household. In an effort to examine whether there are significant 
differences in the vulnerability of households, three of the five case studies have also re-
estimated a slightly amended version of equation (1) 
 
() ( ) htv htv htv htv tv tv tv htv X y Z Z y D c ε γ δ γ β δ ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ + = ∆ ∑ ln * ln ln  (9) 
 
where Z is a binary variable identifying households with a particular observed characteristic. 
In this specification the sign and size of the parameter δ identifies the extent to which there is 
higher or lower covariation between income and consumption changes in the group of 
households with this specific characteristic relative to the reference group of households 
without this characteristic. Along similar lines the t-value associated with δ allows one to test 
whether this difference is significant.
27  
  In Russia, for example, the variable Z identifies the poverty status of the household in 
round V (or round VIII),
28 whether the household is in a rural or urban area, whether the 
household resides in one of the eight regions covered by the survey, whether there are 
children between 0 and 6 years of age in the household, whether the household head is 
retired, whether the household head is a female, the type of occupation of the household 
                                                      
27 The Bangladesh and Ethiopia studies did a similar analysis but with a slightly different 
methodology.  In future work the same analysis will be performed for these two countries. 
28  A household is classified as poor in round V (or round VIII) if its per capita consumption 
expenditures is less that or equal to the 30th percentile of per capita consumption expenditures in 
round V.   20
head, and whether the household owns any land.
29 It is found that in round VIII of the survey 
(the round collected soon after the August 1998 crisis) the set of poor households consisted 
of households that had a significantly higher covariance between food consumption and 
income. This suggests that it is the more vulnerable households that become poor at a time of 
crisis.  At the same time households with younger children were found to be less vulnerable 
(perhaps as a consequence of the child allowances they receive) while female households 
were more vulnerable. 
  The Mali case study includes an even greater number of observable characteristics 
but only a handful of them turn out to capture any significant differences in the vulnerability 
of households to risk. As in the Russia study the same socioeconomic characteristics 
appeared to be more or less correlated with higher vulnerability to risk, depending on 
whether on focused on food consumption or nonfood consumption. Female-headed 
households, households with young children, households with young and old household 
heads and households with more than four members are all found to not be significantly more 
vulnerable than their respective reference groups. However, households without access to 
irrigation infrastructure proved to be more vulnerable to risk. In terms of food consumption 
vulnerability, those households with activities focused around non-crop production (such as 
pastoralists, fishers and artisans) and those who were not members of the dominant ethnic 
group turned out to be relatively more vulnerable to risk. 
The Mexico study taking advantage of the randomized design of the sample was also 
able to compare the vulnerability to risk between villages covered and not yet covered by 
PROGRESA (treatment versus control villages). The findings suggested that a poverty 
alleviation program providing cash transfers conditioned on households investing in their 
human capital has the potential of combining long-urn poverty alleviation with improved 
opportunities for insuring consumption from income fluctuations. 
 
                                                      
29 Although it is possible that some of these characteristics may change over time, they are treated as 
time invariant and the information of the initial observation of each household is used in order to 
assign values for the indicator variable Z.   21
Identifying Household-Specific Capacity to Insure  
In order to derive a household-specific measure of consumption insurance, three of 
the country studies (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Russia) took the extra step of estimating a 
household-specific estimate of the covariance between total consumption (and food 
consumption separately) and income growth rate over the rounds of the available surveys.
  
Given the acute shortage of degrees of freedom associated with having at most four 
observations on consumption and income growth rates household specific estimates of β 
were derived using an alternative (but for all practical purposes) equivalent approach to 
estimating regression equation 1 (see Mace, 1991; and Townsend, 1994). For brevity, we 
will describe how the household specific measure of vulnerability was constructed in the 
Russia study which contained the greatest number of survey rounds (i.e. five rounds). 
First, round-specific means by community (PSU) were estimated for the change in the 
log of total expenditure per capita and the change in the log of income per capita. Second, the 
household specific growth rates in total consumption and income were expressed as 
deviations from the round and community-specific means, respectively. Third, limiting the 
sample to the households with at least 3 observations on changes in the log of consumption 
and income per capita changes one regression for each of the 2,867 households satisfying 
this restriction was estimated. A household-specific vulnerability measure was then 
constructed based the different coefficients obtained from the 2,867 household-specific 
regressions estimated.
30  
  As constructed the household-specific consumption insurance measure reflects the 
ability of households to insure their total consumption from idiosyncratic income risk. In 
order to examine the possible sensitivity of the measure to the exclusion of the aggregate 
shocks, the Russian case study constructed an alternative measure that is inclusive of both 
                                                      
30 It necessary to acknowledge that the low degrees of freedom associated with each household-
specific regression result in very high standard errors for the estimated β or consumption insurance 
measure of each household. Also, as noted earlier, there remain potential complications due to 
measurement errors in the income variable.  In the absence of a better alternative it was determined 
that it was worthwhile to explore this approach in spite of the limitations just noted. In order to 
minimize the potential influence of extreme outliers values of household-specific β ‘s less than the 1   22
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks by skipping the first two steps above and simply 
regressing the household specific growth rate in consumption on the household specific 
growth rate in income.  
  In terms of the notation used above the vulnerability measure for household h was 
constructed based on the coefficient 
h
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whereas the household-specific vulnerability measure inclusive of both aggregate and 
idiosyncratic shocks was based on the coefficient 
h
1 β  derived from the regression 
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Table 6 presents coefficients of per capita consumption in a regression of the 
estimated consumption insurance measures on observed household characteristics (at the 
initial round of observation of each household) (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6), as well as 
some measures of goodness-of-fit for Russia, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia.  For comparison the 
same consumption insurance measures were constructed based on food consumption instead 
of total consumption in equation (10) and (11) above. These corresponding estimates are 
presented in columns 3 and 4 of table 6.  
Table 6 
As the low R-squared of the regressions reveal, observed household characteristics explain a 
very small fraction of the variance of the estimated household-specific degree of 
consumption insurance. For Russia, irrespective of whether consumption insurance is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
percentile and greater than the 99th percentile of the distribution of β’s across all households were 
excluded from the later stages of the analysis.  
31 Equations (10) and  (11) were also estimated with an intercept term. This did not result in any 
remarkable changes in the estimates reported in tables 6  and 7.   23
measured based on insurance from idiosyncratic shocks to income or not (see Skoufias 
2002a), the main variables that are significantly correlated with the level of household 
consumption variability are mainly those identifying the region that the household is in. 
Except for the variable identifying whether a household has members that are retired all other 
household characteristics do not appear to have a significant role in explaining differences in 
household consumption insurance. Both measures of insurance also seem to be negatively 
correlated with the total consumption per capita. Thus, ceteris paribus, in a cross-section of 
households wealthier (poorer) households are more (less) able to insure. Lastly, practically 
the same picture emerges if one were to construct an insurance measure based solely on food 
consumption instead of total consumption (compare estimates in panel B with those in panel 
A of table 6). 
  Results from Bangladesh and Ethiopia are more lackluster (see Quisumbing 2002a, 
2002b for details).  While the variability of food consumption in Bangladesh (or an inability 
to insure food consumption from idiosyncratic shocks) is negatively related to per capita 
consumption, indicating that wealthier households are better able to insure, the consumption 
insurance measure does not correlate significantly with other observed household 
characteristics.  Only the proportion of adolescent females significantly increases the 
variability of total consumption.   In Ethiopia, the number of male adults increases variability 
of food consumption with respect to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, while the number of 
females decreases it.  However, none of the other covariates—including per capita 
consumption—is significant. 
  To further investigate the potential uses of the consumption insurance measures 
employed here, the Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Russia studies also examined whether they are 
significantly associated with the proportion of time a household spends in poverty and the 
probability that a household is ever poor. 
32The former variable is constructed by simply 
diving the total number of rounds is classified as poor by the number of rounds, while the 
latter is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the household is classified as poor in any of   24
the survey rounds. The poverty status of a household in any given round was determined by 
comparing total per capita consumption in the survey round with the relevant poverty line.
33  
The consumption insurance measure presented in Table 7 is the variability of food 
consumption  with respect to income. 
Table 7 
In Russia, food consumption variability, defined here by the partial covariance between the 
growth rate in food consumption and income, has no significant role in explaining the 
proportion of time a household spends in poverty. This result holds irrespective of whether 
vulnerability to risk is defined to include or exclude the role of aggregate shocks. However,  
food consumption variability appears to be positively and significantly correlated with the 
probability of a household ever becoming poor (even after controlling for the initial level of 
household consumption per capita).   In Ethiopia, food consumption variability, inclusive of 
aggregate shocks, is positively correlated with the proportion of time spent in poverty as well 
as the probability of being poor in any round.  The effect becomes weaker once only 
idiosyncratic shocks are considered, emphasizing the importance of aggregate shocks in 
Ethiopia.  For Bangladesh, however, food consumption variability is  not significantly 
correlated with any of the poverty measures.  Similar analyses showed that the variability of 
total consumption is a positive and significant determinant of the proportion of time spent in 
poverty only for Russia.  Given the large budget share spent on food in Ethiopia, variability 





                                                                                                                                                                      
32 It should be noted that a similar approach was adopted in the Bangladesh study and it yielded no 
significant correlation between vulnerability and the probability of “ever being poor” and “being 
always poor”. 
33 The Bangladesh poverty line is the lower poverty line constructed using the Cost of Basic Needs 
Method (World Bank 1998), which differs across regions;  the Ethiopia poverty line is that 
constructed by Dercon and Krishnan (2000) using the Cost of Basic Needs method, converted to 1997   25
4.  SHOCKS AND FAMILY RISK COPING MECHANISMS 
 
Having established that households are only partially able to insure, it is of interest to 
examine the mechanisms used to cope with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.  Overall the 
results reported in the five case studies revealed that households employed a portfolio of 
strategies rather than favoring one single coping strategy.  However, differences in country 
settings and institutional context are immediately apparent in the choice of coping 
mechanisms.  The coping strategies examined included getting (or having) a second paying 
job (Russia and Mexico), getting involved in informal economic activities (Russia), receiving 
remittances from friends and relatives (Bangladesh, Mali, Mexico, and Russia), receiving 
public transfers or participating in public safety net programs (Bangladesh, Ethiopia), getting 
in debt (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, Mexico, and Russia), selling assets such as poultry or 
livestock) (Bangladesh, Mali, Mexico, and Russia), and cultivating land (Russia).  The Mali 
study also examined such additional coping strategies as diversification and changes in the 
composition of food consumption, while the Bangladesh and Ethiopia studies examined 
whether different categories of households were equally able to use risk-coping mechanisms.   
Regressions on the use of coping mechanisms in response to the idiosyncratic shocks are 
presented in Table 8.  To the extent possible, the case studies employed techniques which 
control for the potential role of unobserved household heterogeneity in determining how 
households respond to shocks, but using the same technique was not possible in all studies 
because of data differences. 
Table 8 
The first two panels of Table 8 present the results from Mali and Russia, which both 
employ fixed-effects logit.  In Russia, households appeared to complement their self-
insurance strategies, consisting of adjustments in labor supply, and selling assets land, with 
informal risk sharing strategies that spread risk over time and households. The same general 
patterns were also observed in Mali where households made additional adjustments by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
values and to per capita terms for consistency with the other vulnerability studies.  The poverty line 
for the Russia study  was the 25th percentile of per capita consumption in round V.   26
changing the composition and frequency of food consumption (such as serving less preferred 
foods more frequently, or serving less food to men or women or children). Moreover, in 
Mali, there were significant differences between the coping strategies of asset poor and asset 
rich households. 
In the Mexico case study, fixed effects logit analysis was not possible because 
information on how households might respond to idiosyncratic shocks is collected in only 
one round (November 1999) of the survey.   The estimated marginal effects of the various 
shock variables on the probability of adopting a specific response are reported in the third 
panel of table 8 for households in the control villages which were not included in the 
PROGRESA conditional subsidy program.
34 Overall the results for households in control 
villages reveal that there is no single strategy that is used most frequently by households. 
Harvest loss, for example, appears to trigger multiple household responses including the 
selling of animals, borrowing and receiving help from government and relatives. 
35 
In the Bangladesh and Ethiopia case studies, in all survey periods a large number of 
households made use of coping mechanisms such as incurring debt, selling assets, receiving 
transfers from friends or relatives, and participating in public safety net programs.  Thus, the 
lack of variation in terms of entry and exit into programs or types of coping mechanisms 
made fixed effects logit estimation inappropriate, as it led to the exclusion of the majority of 
the sample from estimation. Both fixed and random effects estimation procedures were used 
instead; only the fixed effects results are reported in the fourth and fifth panels of Table 8. 
                                                      
34 All shock dummy variables were included simultaneously in the probit regression. Estimation 
using random effect (at the village level) probit did not lead to any substantive change in the results 
obtained using simple probit.  The case study also included separate estimates for PROGRESA 
(treatment) villages, 
35 The analysis in Skoufias (2002b) also suggests that there does not appear to be any 
significant differences in how households in PROGRESA villages respond to these shocks. The only 
notable difference is that households in PROGRESA villages seem to respond differently than 
households in control villages when there is shock leading to the loss of animals. Relative to 
households in control villages, they are less likely to respond by selling animals or borrowing, or 
working more, and more likely to receive help from relatives. Also, the loss of other households 
items or the loss of a home is more likely to result in receiving help from the government. There also 
indications that the presence of the PROGRESA program induces households to use adjustments in 
their labor supply less frequently than households in control villages for coping with the incidence of 
some shocks.    27
Based on the fixed effects results, it seems that household coping mechanisms are not 
responsive to idiosyncratic shocks in Bangladesh.  However, random effects regressions 
which include controls for time-invariant characteristics of households show that these 
characteristics are important determinants of the use of risk-smoothing mechanisms.  For 
example, poorer households may not be equally able to make use of private coping 
mechanisms such as credit.  Net debt is higher for households whose heads have secondary 
or more schooling, as well as those with more nonland assets, possibly because the latter can 
be used as collateral.  Remittances are higher in households whose heads have at least 
primary schooling and for larger families, and in households with a higher proportion of 
adult females.  This may reflect kin support networks, such as brothers who make 
remittances to their adult sisters, often in exchange for her inheritance (Subramanian 1998).
36  
In contrast to private coping mechanisms, public transfers seem to have a more redistributive 
impact.  Both food for education (FFE) and relief go to households with smaller 
landholdings; relief also is directed towards households with lower values of nonland assets. 
There is some indication that public transfers also serve some consumption-smoothing 
function; FFE receipts increase with a female illness shock and relief receipts increase with 
livestock losses.   
In Ethiopia, the use of private and public risk-smoothing mechanisms seems to 
decrease in response to a favorable idiosyncratic shock, in this case, favorable crop 
outcomes.  Favorable crop outcomes reduce net debt, receipts from free distribution of food 
aid, and earnings from food for work, although they surprisingly increase transfer receipts 
from friends, family members, and government programs.  However, fixed effects estimates 
do not enable one to discern whether different categories of households are equally able to 
use these consumption-smoothing mechanisms. Similar to the Bangladesh case study, the 
Ethiopia case study estimated the levels (not changes) in net debt, net asset sales, remittance 
receipts, and public transfers, taking into account household characteristics, idiosyncratic 
shocks, and individual heterogeneity.   
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  Results not reported here (Quisumbing 2002b) suggest that idiosyncratic shocks do 
not appear to significantly affect levels of net debt, but transfer receipts decrease when 
rainfall and livestock disease outcomes are better.  Transfer receipts may also tend to favor 
wealthier households:  receipts are positively correlated with education of the head, land area 
and the value of household assets.  While receipts from free distribution of food aid decrease 
with favorable rainfall and livestock disease outcomes, there are indications that free 
distribution does not necessarily reach the poorest households.  Free distribution receipts (a 
subset of transfer receipts) are higher for households with more education and with larger 
areas cultivated, and also decrease with the number of male and female adults, consistent 
with earlier results in Quisumbing (2001).
 37  FFW receipts increase with worse livestock 
disease, crop damage, and illness outcomes, but are unexpected positively affected by good 
rainfall.  Unlike free distribution, FFW seems to be better targeted to poorer households. 
Female income from various activities, while expectedly correlated with female headship, is 
also higher for households with larger land areas and and nonland assets.  Levels of female 
income also increase with favorable livestock disease outcomes, which is expected since a 
large portion of women’s income is obtained from the sale of livestock and dairy products.   
 
5. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
This paper has summarized five studies using household panel data from Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Mali, Mexico and Russia, all examining the extent to which households are able 
through formal and/or informal arrangements to insure their consumption from specific 
economic shocks and fluctuations in their real income.  
Building on the recent literature on consumption smoothing and risk sharing, we 
attempt to relate a household’s degree of consumption insurance (or consumption variability) 
to its vulnerability to poverty.  The consumption insurance measure is defined by the degree 
                                                                                                                                                                      
36 Using data from this survey, Quisumbing and de la Briere (2000) show that current assets owned 
by women are higher if she has more brothers. 
37 Jayne et al. (1999) also find a negative relationship between per capita food aid receipts and 
household size.  The negative relationship turns positive when household FFW receipts rather than 
per capita receipts are used as the dependent variable.   29
to which the growth rate of household food consumption covaries with the growth rate of 
household income.   Some of the advantages of the proposed measure of consumption 
insurance is the opportunity it offers to determine consumption variability arising from 
idiosyncratic risk and covariate risk either separately as well as in combination. It is 
independent of the poverty status of a household or the level of the poverty line.   However, 
some  of the disadvantages of this measure are as follows.  First, it requires repeated 
observations (panel data) on households. Second, the survey must collect information on 
both household consumption and income. Third it is subject to a variety of biases arising 
from measurement error in income, imputation error in food consumption and endogeneity of 
income.   The availability of repeated observations per household allows the construction of 
a household-specific measure of consumption insurance based on total as well as food 
consumption. This in turn provides the opportunity to examine in more detail the partial 
correlation of household consumption insurance with household characteristics as well as the 
extent to which consumption variability is correlated with the incidence of poverty. 
The empirical estimates of one of three studies (Russia) provide some tentative 
confirmation that consumption variability with respect to income changes is negatively 
associated with the level of household consumption and positively associated with the 
incidence of poverty.  No significant evidence is found on the role of consumption variability 
and the proportion of time a household spends in poverty.  Estimates from Bangladesh 
suggest that the household-specific variability of food consumption is negatively associated 
with the level of household consumption, but neither the variability of food nor total 
consumption is significantly associated with the probability of being poor or the proportion 
of time spent in poverty.  For Ethiopia, neither measure of consumption variability is 
correlated with household per capita consumption, but the degree of food consumption 
variability is positively and significantly associated with the proportion of time spent in 
poverty as well as the probability of being poor. 
Is this measure of consumption variability useful in assessing vulnerability to risk?  
The consumption insurance measure adequately captures sensitivity to risk and income 
fluctuations.  However, it falls short of being a measure of vulnerability for a number of   30
reasons.
38 First, it does not allow for differences between positive and negative shocks, nor 
distinguish between responses to unanticipated risk and anticipated fluctuations.  From a 
policy point of view, one would be more concerned with the inability to cope with the 
consequences of a negative shock, rather than a positive shock.  Second, the consumption 
variability measure is not related to the size of income risk faced by the household.  It has 
been pointed out (Dercon 2002) that using the measure of consumption insurance as a 
measure of vulnerability to risk is consistent only if income risk is identical across 
households and only if it is exogenous.  The results on risk-coping mechanisms—which 
show that households diversify income sources to cope with risk—make the assumption of 
exogenous income risk unwarranted.   
Have we advanced our understanding of households’ ability to cope with risk?  Most 
tests of consumption smoothing allude to the role of community-based insurance 
mechanisms as underlying observed risk sharing, but are silent as to the particular types of 
mechanisms used.  In examining the various risk-coping strategies used by households, the 
case studies have shown that households use a portfolio of strategies, but that different types 
of households may have differential ability to use these strategies.  In particular, poorer 
households may be less able to use mechanisms which rely to initial wealth as collateral.  In 
this regard, public transfer programs may have a more redistributive effect.  How useful is 
each strategy in smoothing consumption fluctuations, and what is the relative importance of 
each strategy?  It would be useful to quantitatively establish the role played by each of these 
strategies in smoothing consumption, in order to judge their importance in the household’s 
risk-coping portfolio.
39 
The results of this study provide empirical confirmation of the potential benefits 
associated with a more effective social protection strategy. Given that households differ in 
their ability to protect themselves from shocks, it appears that there are significant gains 
associated with the adoption of a social protection system that not only provides support for 
                                                      
38 We are grateful to Stefan Dercon for most of the points raised in this paragraph. 
39 For example, Dercon (2002) suggest that one could establish the extent of consumption fluctuations 
caused by income shocks from a version of (5).  Then, one could investigate the value of the change   31
the critically poor but also assists households, and communities to better manage risk. As this 
study suggests, the targeting of social safety net programs, for example, need not be based 
solely on the current poverty status of the household (ideally measured by consumption per 
capita), or whether a shock impacted on a household. Social program targeting can be 
effectively complemented with indicators of the ability of the household to protect its 
consumption from such shocks. Taking into consideration these factors and devoting efforts 
to identify households that are less able to insure their total or food consumption, in 
particular, may be an important consideration to be introduced in the targeting of the social 
safety net system of developing countries. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
in livestock holdings, or transfers, than can be directly linked to income shocks via regressions, 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1:  Least squares determinants of change in food consumption per capita 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 














Ln(value of livestock losses)  0.005 
(0.69) 
     
Female illness  -0.002 
(0.25) 
     
Male illness  0.011* 
(1.72) 
     
          
Rainfall Index (1 is best)    -0.047 
(0.64) 
    
Livestock Disease Index (1 is best)    0.261** 
(2.23) 
      39




    
Crop Index (1 is best)    -0.035 
(0.53) 
    
Days lost due to Illness (1 is best)    0.010 
(0.87) 
    
          
Crops were attacked by insects      -0.030 
(0.60) 
  
At least one member of household lost 
productive time due to illness 
   0.038 
(1.04) 
  
Lost livestock due to theft or death      0.034 
(0.76) 
  
Land cultivated less than land available      0.023 
(0.45) 
  
        
Lost Land?        0.011 
(0.62) 
 
Lost Harvest?        0.009 
(0.70) 
 
Lost Animals?        0.007     40
(0.20) 
Lost Home/Other items?        -0.036 
(0.68) 
 
          
Owed Wages          -0.055* 
(1.81) 
On Forced leave          0.054 
(0.28) 





Dependent variable is change in log per capita of food consumption. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5%level. 
Absolute value of t-statistics is in parentheses. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White method. 
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Table 2:  Least squares determinants of change in non-food consumption per capita 
 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) 













Ln(value of livestock losses)  -0.003 
(0.25) 
     
Female illness  0.000 
(0.00) 
     
Male illness  0.003 
(0.30) 
     
        
Rainfall Index (1 is best)    -0.121 
(1.15) 
    
Livestock Disease Index (1 is best)    0.107 
(0.68) 
    
Lack of Water or Grazing Land (1 is    -0.214         42
best) (1.50) 
Crop Index (1 is best)    -0.003 
(0.03) 
    
Days lost due to Illness (1 is best)    -0.019 
(1.14) 
    
        
Crops were attacked by insects      0.142 
(0.93) 
  
At least one member of household lost 
productive time due to illness 
   0.232** 
(2.30) 
  
Lost livestock due to theft or death      -0.244** 
(2.14) 
  
Land cultivated less than land available      0.042 
(0.34) 
  
          
Lost Land?        -0.062 
(1.89) 
 
Lost Harvest?        0.014 
(0.63) 
   43
Lost Animals        -0.038 
(0.65) 
 
Lost Home/Other items?        -0.056 
(0.62) 
 
          
Owed Wages          -0.098* 
(2.19) 
On Forced leave          -0.201 
(0.97) 





Dependent variable is change in log per capita of food consumption 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5%level. 
Absolute value of t-statistics is in parentheses. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White method.   44
Table 3: The impact of changes in log household per capita income on log household per capita consumption: OLS estimates 
 












          










































* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5%level.  
Absolute value of t-statistics is in parentheses.  
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White method.    45
Table 4:  Impact of change in Mean log village income on log per capita consumption OLS estimates 
 
Estimates of γ 














         










         










         










         
Notes:  
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5%level.  
Absolute value of t-statistics is in parentheses.  
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White method.   46
Table 5: The impact of changes in log household per capita income on log household per capita consumption 
 
Instrumental Variable Estimates 














         










          










         










          
Notes:  
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5%level.  
Absolute value of t-statistics is in parentheses.  
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White method.  47





(A):   Degree of Insurance of Total 
Consumption from 
 










Shocks Shocks      Shocks  Shocks 
    Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value 
Russia   
Ln (total consumption per capita)  -0.046 -2.19** -0.079 -3.94**  -0.056 -2.37** -0.085 -3.82**
Nobs  2867       2866    2869       2867 
F-value / LR chi2  1.59       1.64    1.83       2.17 
Prob>F / Prob > chi2  0.03       0.02    0.01       0.00 
R-squared / Pseudo R-Squared  0.01       0.02    0.02       0.02 
Bangladesh   
Ln (total consumption per capita)  0.00 0.05 0.00 1.20  0.00 -2.21** 0.00 0.93
Nobs 919      917    919      917 
F-value / LR chi2  1.11      0.28    0.72      0.07 
Prob>F / Prob > chi2  0.32      1.00    0.83      1.00 
R-squared / Pseudo R-Squared  0.02      0.04    0.02      0.04 
Ethiopia   
Ln (total consumption per capita)  0.00 0.48 20.58 0.14  0.00 0.46 0.00 -0.90  48
Nobs 765 703   765 703
F-value / LR chi2  0.97 n.c.   4.16 n.c.
Prob>F / Prob > chi2  0.50 n.c.   0.00 n.c.
R-squared / Pseudo R-Squared  0.01 0.04   0.01 0.03
 
Notes:  Regressors included the age and education of the household head, whether the household is female headed, occupational dummes, 
household size and demographic characteristics, land and asset holdings, and site or regional dummies. 
 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5%level. 
The t-statistics reported are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White method. 
   49




Time Spent in  
Poverty 
The Probability of  
Being Poor in  any 
Round 
The Proportion of 
Time Spent in  
Poverty 
The Probability of 
Being Poor in  any
Round 
   Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
1   2  3   4 
Russia   
Degree of Food Consumption 
Insurance (Incl. Aggregate Shocks) 
-0.209 -0.37 0.060 4.94** 
Degree of Food Consumption 
Insurance from Idiosyncratic Shocks  
 -0.463 0.85 0.035 3.10**
   
Bangladesh   
Degree of Food Consumption 
Insurance (Incl. Aggregate Shocks) 
0.00 0.52 0.00 0.33 
Degree of Food Consumption 
Insurance from Idiosyncratic Shocks  
 -0.01 -0.85 -0.04 -1.41
   
Ethiopia   
Degree of Food Consumption 
Insurance (Incl. Aggregate Shocks) 
0.01 2.20** 0.01 1.92* 
Degree of Food Consumption    0.04 1.86* 0.03 1.59  50
Insurance from Idiosyncratic Shocks  
 
Notes:  Regressors included the age and education of the household head, whether the household is female headed, occupational 
dummies, household size and demographic characteristics, land and asset holdings, and site or regional dummies 
 
The coefficients in columns 2 and 4 are the marginal effects on the probability of falling into poverty (dF/dx). 
The poverty status of a household is determined relative to poverty lines described in the text. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5%level. 
The t-statistics reported are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White method.  51
 
Table 8.  Idiosyncratic shocks and household coping mechanisms 
 
  Mali, fixed effects logit







Aid from family and 
friends (food gifts) 










At least one member of household lost 
































Notes: All shock variables are included simultaneously in the regression. Additional regressors included but not reported include: Time varying 
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  Russia, fixed effects logit
  Get a 2




Borrow money  Sold assets last 
three months 































Note:  All three shock variables are included simultaneously in the regression. Additional regressors included but not reported: A constant term, 
binary variables describing the age/gender composition of the household in each round,  the round  of the survey, and whether the household is 
headed by a female of working age or a retired male or female.  z-values in parentheses.   53
 
Table 8, continued   
  Mexico, households in control villages, probit 

























































1--All shock variables are included at the same time in the regression. Additional regressors included but not reported: a constant 
term, variables describing the age and gender composition of the household  in each round, the age of the household head whether the  
household is headed  by a female,   the education level of the household head, binary variables for the type of occupation of the head, 
an index summarizing the asset  holdings of the household,  the eligibility status of the household for PROGRESA benefits, and  
binary variables describing whether other government programs operate in the locality (DIF, LICONSA, PROBECAT, Tortilla 
Solidaridad, Empleo Temporal, Educ. Scholarship). prior to October 1997.  z-values reported in parentheses. 
2--All coefficients reported are in terms of marginal effects on the probability of the respective outcome (dF/dx). 
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 Bangladesh, fixed effects
  Net debt  Net asset sales Remittances  Food for 
Education 
Relief 
Ln(value of livestock losses)    -26.12 
(1 07)


















Male illness    25.21 









Note: All three shock variables are included simultaneously in the regression. Additional regressors included the age of the 
household head, whether the household is female headed, household size and demographic characteristics. t-statistics in 
parentheses. 
Table 8, continued   
 Ethiopia, fixed effects




FFW earnings  Women’s 
income





















































Note: All  shock variables are included simultaneously in the regression. Additional regressors included a dummy for a female-headed 
household, age and age squared of the household head,  the number of male and female adults, and the dependency ratio. t-statistics in 
parentheses. 
 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5%level. 
Absolute value of t-statistics is in parentheses. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using Huber-White method. 
 
 
 